On 4 May 2026, Main Committee III of the Eleventh Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), entrusted with issues relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, began its work. During deliberations (see here, here, here and here), Egypt delivered a series of statements in its national capacity and, on several occasions, on behalf of the Arab Group, which also submitted a number of textual proposals concerning the draft outcome document.

Throughout their interventions, Egypt and the Arab Group stressed that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy constitute one of the three fundamental pillars of the Treaty and an integral component of the bargain upon which the NPT is based. They reaffirmed that the exercise of this right should not be subject to restrictions or conditions beyond those provided for under the Treaty and opposed the growing tendency to impose additional requirements under the pretexts of non-proliferation or nuclear safety. Egypt emphasized that such practices create double standards, particularly when certain non-parties to the Treaty continue to benefit from nuclear cooperation while remaining outside the comprehensive safeguards system.

Shared positions also included support for strengthening international cooperation through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), particularly its Technical Cooperation Programme, which constitutes the principal mechanism for transferring nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Egypt and the Arab Group called for adequate, sustainable and predictable financing of technical cooperation activities and stressed the importance of capacity-building, technology transfer and the training of skilled labour forces in support of sustainable development. They highlighted the contribution of nuclear applications to health, cancer treatment, food security, water management and energy security and emphasized that technical cooperation should continue to be implemented in accordance with the IAEA Statute and without additional criteria or political considerations.

Egypt and the Arab Group further underlined that responsibility for nuclear safety and nuclear security rests exclusively with States and warned against using safety and security measures as a pretext for restricting the inalienable right to peaceful uses. They noted the outcome of the 2024 IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS 2024: Shaping the Future) – a global forum held in Vienna to discuss the future of nuclear security and strengthen international cooperation in the field – and stressed that obligations relating to nuclear safety and security are legally distinct from safeguards obligations and should not be conflated. They further noted that nuclear security activities are financed through the Nuclear Security Fund, thereby underlining the distinct legal and financial architecture governing each regime.

Egypt highlighted the growing importance of emerging technologies, particularly Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and artificial intelligence, emphasizing their potential contribution to national development objectives. At the same time, Egypt stressed the need to establish appropriate frameworks ensuring their safe, secure and responsible deployment and called for a balanced approach to the technical and practical challenges associated with the use of artificial intelligence. 

The Arab Group called upon Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA in addressing transparency concerns related to the Bushehr reactor, stressed the importance of Iran's accession to all relevant international nuclear safety instruments and underscored the need to take into account the environmental concerns of the countries of the region.

The Arab Group also commended IAEA General Conference resolution GC(69)/RES/10, which expanded the Technical Cooperation Programme with the State of Palestine to include the Gaza Strip. The Group called upon the IAEA to establish an out-of-cycle technical programme for Gaza in accordance with Palestinian priorities and to strengthen its support to Palestine through the Technical Cooperation Programme in the West Bank. It further called upon the international community to compel Israel to allow the safe and unimpeded access of IAEA equipment and personnel to the State of Palestine, including the Gaza Strip, with a view to facilitating both emergency and long-term assistance.

The Arab Group further expressed concern regarding Israel's continued policy of nuclear ambiguity and its status as a non-party to the Treaty outside the comprehensive safeguards system. It also voiced concern over reports concerning expansion works at the Dimona reactor and criticized the continuation of nuclear cooperation between States Parties and non-parties, considering such practices incompatible with paragraph 12 of Decision 2 adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference entitled “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, which established full-scope IAEA safeguards as a necessary precondition for new nuclear supply arrangements to non-nuclear-weapon States.

The Group called upon States and the IAEA to halt technical cooperation with Israel until it accedes to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and places all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive safeguards. It also expressed concern regarding exceptions granted to non-parties under the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines, considering such practices incompatible with Article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty – which prohibits the supply of source or special fissionable material and related equipment to non-nuclear-weapon States unless they are subject to IAEA safeguards – and reaffirmed that military attacks against safeguarded peaceful nuclear facilities are unacceptable.

In their responses to the Zero Draft and the subsequent Rev.1 outcome document: -

• Egypt and the Arab Group consistently advocated for respecting States' sovereign decisions regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided they align with international obligations.
• They also called for broader references to the diverse applications of nuclear energy – including healthcare, water management and energy security – and welcomed the reflection in Rev.1 of several proposals aimed at strengthening international cooperation and expanding peaceful applications. The Arab Group further stressed that such cooperation, technology transfer and capacity-building efforts should be pursued in conformity with Articles I, II and III of the Treaty.
• Another area of focus concerned the modalities governing technical cooperation programmes. Both the Arab Group and Egypt stressed that IAEA technical cooperation programmes should be formulated and implemented in accordance with the Agency's Statute , its guiding principles and relevant General Conference resolutions and supported through predictable and sustained financing, while mobilizing additional resources for peaceful uses.
• The Arab Group consistently objected to the vague and non-consensual phrase “highest standards” of safety and security and warned that such language could be used to restrict Article IV rights.
• Egypt, speaking in its national capacity, also opposed singling out specific initiatives, noting that many enjoy broad participation, and reaffirmed the need to eliminate undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty, recalling Action 51 of the 2010 Action Plan, which calls upon States Parties to eliminate any undue constraints that are inconsistent with the Treaty and could hamper the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Egypt further stressed that, whenever uncertainty exists regarding whether a particular formulation enjoys consensus, preference should be given to previously agreed language.

Egypt, for its part, aligned itself with the Arab and African Groups in advocating the use of the expression “appropriate and effective measures” contained in Action 57 of the 2010 Action Plan, which calls for the adoption of appropriate and effective measures relating to nuclear safety and security without hampering international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. They further opposed the inclusion of the term “safeguarded” in relation to SMRs and sought to preserve the Zero Draft's original language concerning the safety and security of nuclear facilities.