

NPT RevCon XI– Main Committee I: Egypt’s Inputs to the Draft Outcome Document

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On 30 April 2026, Main Committee I of the Eleventh Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT RevCon XI), entrusted with issues relating to nuclear disarmament and security assurances, commenced its work. During the Committee’s deliberations (see [here](#), [here](#), [here](#), [here](#) and [here](#)), Egypt –both in its national capacity and on behalf of the Arab Group– delivered a series of statements and submitted a number of textual proposals concerning the draft outcome document.

Throughout their interventions, Egypt and the Arab Group reiterated the key positions they had advanced during the [General Debate](#) on nuclear disarmament, while also expressing concern over emerging challenges, particularly the integration of artificial intelligence into nuclear weapons systems.

They further expressed concern over the expiry of the New START Treaty, signed between the United States and the Russian Federation in 2010 and constituting the last remaining bilateral strategic arms control agreement, and called for renewed negotiations on successor arrangements providing deeper reductions in nuclear arsenals. They also emphasized the importance of preserving voluntary moratoria on nuclear testing and promoting the entry into force of the [Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty \(CTBT\)](#), adopted in 1996 to prohibit all nuclear explosions, recalling Action 10 of the 2010 Action Plan – which recognizes the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon States and Annex II States whose ratification is required for the Treaty’s entry into force.

In its national interventions, Egypt recalled the Final Document of [the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament \(SSOD-I\)](#), adopted in 1978 as the foundational United Nations framework on disarmament, which identified nuclear disarmament as the highest priority of the international community. Egypt expressed concern over the paralysis of the Conference on Disarmament and called for a time-bound framework accompanied by measurable benchmarks. It highlighted the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use or testing of nuclear weapons and stressed the application of the principles of verification and irreversibility, including placing fissile material no longer required for military purposes under IAEA safeguards.

Egypt also called for restoring balance between the obligations of nuclear-weapon States under Article VI and the extensive verification obligations already assumed by non-nuclear-weapon States.

Speaking on behalf of the Arab Group, Egypt called for the convening of the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-IV), which has remained pending since the First Special Session in 1978 and is intended to review the international disarmament machinery and establish a new consensus-based framework for advancing global disarmament efforts. The Group also welcomed the commitments relating to nuclear disarmament contained in [the Pact for the Future](#), adopted by the [United Nations Summit of the Future in 2024](#), which called for renewed efforts towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, reduction of nuclear risks and strengthening the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture.

The Group reiterated that confidence-building and nuclear risk reduction measures cannot substitute for the implementation of disarmament obligations and supported both negative and positive security assurances. It also stressed the importance of establishing a time-bound framework for nuclear disarmament within the Conference on Disarmament. The Group opposed any resumption of nuclear testing and emphasized that any future treaty banning the production of fissile material should be non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and should address past production, existing stockpiles and future production. It further emphasized the principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility and reaffirmed the importance of preserving the integrity of [Article IX\(3\) of the NPT](#), which defines nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty.

Throughout the discussions on the Zero Draft outcome document and the subsequent revised draft, Egypt and the Arab Group submitted a series of proposals aimed at strengthening references to previously agreed commitments.

Egypt proposed stronger language on nuclear disarmament and universality, reaffirmation of the unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their arsenals and extending concerns regarding nuclear-sharing arrangements to both existing and potential arrangements.

Speaking on behalf of the Arab Group, Egypt proposed the following:-

- Including explicit references to the outcomes of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, replacing references to commitments “provided” by previous Review Conferences with commitments “agreed” by them and replacing calls for diminishing the role of nuclear weapons with language aimed at excluding them from military and security doctrines.
- Incorporating Action 5 of the 2010 Action Plan, which calls for accelerating concrete progress towards nuclear disarmament, and called upon nuclear-weapon States to cease investments aimed at modernizing or extending the life of nuclear arsenals.

- Describing the CTBT as an effective measure relating to both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, condemning explicit and implicit nuclear threats as unacceptable, illegitimate and dangerous, lowering the operational readiness status of nuclear weapons and clarifying that nuclear risk reduction measures cannot substitute for total elimination.
- Introducing stronger language on negative security assurances and proposed incorporating Action 17 of the 2010 Action Plan concerning verification arrangements for fissile material removed from military programmes, as well as explicit references to artificial intelligence and the need to maintain full human control over nuclear weapons systems.
- Stressing that the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 did not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons.

With regard to the humanitarian aspects of nuclear disarmament, the Arab Group, represented by Egypt:-

- Criticized the limited treatment of victim assistance and environmental remediation, arguing that key elements such as compensation, rehabilitation, reconstruction, memorialization and guarantees of non-recurrence should be more comprehensively reflected.
- Called for disarmament education to be addressed separately in order to avoid conflating educational efforts with the distinct needs of victims and affected communities.
- Advocated giving greater prominence to nuclear disarmament and proposed complementing the affirmation that a nuclear war must never be fought with the recognition that the only guarantee against its recurrence lies in the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Following the circulation of the first revised draft outcome document (CRP.2/Rev.1), the Arab Group, represented by Egypt, submitted additional textual proposals, including:-

- Replacing “recall” with “reaffirm” in relation to the unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States.
- Restoring references to the “right” rather than the “interest” of non-nuclear-weapon States to receive negative security assurances.
- Maintaining concerns regarding existing and potential nuclear-sharing arrangements.
- Strengthening language on universality by replacing “promptly” with “urgently” and adding the phrase “without conditions or further delay”.
- Proposing that references to the implementation of Article VI include “related commitments”, reaffirming the integrity of Article IX(3).
- Rejecting attempts to dilute the specific disarmament responsibilities of nuclear-weapon States by extending reporting expectations to non-nuclear-weapon States, arguing that such an approach would undermine the obligations assigned under the 2010 Action Plan.
- Opposing efforts to reduce the role of the proposed subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament to a merely consultative forum and, recalling the negotiating legacy of SSOD-I, called for preserving the Review Conference's negotiating function and orienting future work towards the elaboration of an international legally binding instrument.