

NPT RevCon XI– Main Committee II: Egypt’s Inputs to the Draft Outcome Document

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On 4 May 2026, Main Committee II of the Eleventh Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), entrusted with issues relating to safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation, commenced its work. During the Committee’s deliberations (see [here](#), [here](#), [here](#) and [here](#)), Egypt delivered a series of statements in its national capacity and, on several occasions, on behalf of the Arab Group, which also submitted a number of textual proposals concerning the draft outcome document.

Throughout their interventions, Egypt and the Arab Group reaffirmed the importance of preserving the balance among the Treaty’s three pillars and stressed that safeguards and non-proliferation measures should not be pursued at the expense of the inalienable right recognized under [Article IV of the Treaty](#), which guarantees the right of States Parties to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

They reiterated that the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, concluded pursuant to [Article III](#) and based on IAEA document [INFCIRC/153](#) – which contains the model comprehensive safeguards agreement and provides the legal framework for verifying that nuclear material in non-nuclear-weapon States is not diverted to military purposes – constitutes the legally binding verification standard established by the Treaty, whereas [the Additional Protocol](#), based on [INFCIRC/540](#) – which contains the model protocol granting the IAEA expanded access and verification tools aimed at detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities – remains a voluntary instrument whose adoption is a sovereign decision of each State Party.

Egypt further stressed that any evolution of safeguards concepts or methodologies, including the State-Level Concept, should remain transparent, consensus-based and firmly grounded in existing legal obligations, without creating new standards or relying on sources of information beyond those legally agreed.

Shared positions also included support for strengthening technical cooperation and capacity-building through the IAEA, promoting the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and ensuring equitable access to the benefits of nuclear science and technology. Egypt and the Arab Group emphasized the importance of narrowing the technological gap between developed and

developing countries and called for adequate, assured and predictable resources for the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme. They also stressed that the implementation of safeguards should be conducted in a manner that avoids hampering the economic and technological development of States Parties.

Egypt and the Arab Group further reaffirmed the importance of preserving previously agreed commitments relating to the Middle East. They stressed that [the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East](#) – which called for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction – remains an integral and inseparable part of the package that enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty. They also highlighted the importance of the ongoing United Nations Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, established pursuant to [General Assembly Decision 73/546 \(2018\)](#) – which launched an annual conference process aimed at negotiating a legally binding treaty establishing such a zone.

Regarding the Iranian nuclear programme, the Arab Group called upon Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA, comply with relevant Board of Governors resolutions and provide all information and access necessary for the Agency to discharge its responsibilities, including through the implementation of relevant Board of Governors decisions.

Commenting on the Zero Draft Outcome, Egypt welcomed the positive elements contained in the outcome document while emphasizing that further improvements were required. Egypt aligned itself with concerns expressed by a number of delegations regarding safeguards and export controls and stressed that the section dealing with the Middle East required stronger language and additional forward-looking elements, indicating that further proposals would be submitted in Subsidiary Body II.

Egypt also underlined that export control arrangements should support rather than undermine Article IV rights and opposed any interpretation that would create additional obligations beyond those established by the Treaty. Moreover, it drew a sharp legal distinction between non-nuclear-weapon States, which have fully complied with their safeguards obligations and possess no history of nuclear testing, and nuclear-weapon States and non-parties. Egypt stressed that the continued failure of nuclear-weapon States and certain non-parties to ratify [the CTBT](#) remains a principal obstacle to its entry into force, thereby undermining the credibility of the non-proliferation regime.

Furthermore, it highlighted that, following the conclusion of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements by Somalia, Guinea and Equatorial Guinea, all non-nuclear-weapon States Parties now fulfil their Article III obligations. This development further underscores the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty and addressing the continued existence of non-parties

possessing nuclear capabilities.

Throughout the discussions on the Zero Draft outcome document and the subsequent revised drafts, Egypt and the Arab Group submitted a number of textual proposals aimed at strengthening references to Article IV rights, preserving the voluntary nature of the Additional Protocol and reaffirming the primacy of comprehensive safeguards agreements under Article III including:-

- Opposing language that could imply additional legal obligations beyond those established by the Treaty and called for stronger references to technical cooperation, technology transfer and the elimination of unjustified restrictions affecting developing countries.
- Seeking stronger language concerning the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the United Nations process established under General Assembly Decision 73/546 (2018).

With regard to safeguards, nuclear supply arrangements and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Arab Group, represented by Egypt:-

- Expressed disappointment over the weakening or omission of previously agreed language relating to the Middle East and nuclear-weapon-free zones and called for preserving earlier Review Conference formulations, emphasizing the importance of establishing such zones where they do not yet exist and recalling the 1999 United Nations Disarmament Commission Principles and Guidelines as the substantive framework governing their establishment.
- Proposed language emphasizing that safeguards should not be portrayed as applying exclusively to non-nuclear-weapon States and called for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful facilities in nuclear-weapon States under their voluntary offer agreements, consistent with Action 30 of [the 2010 Action Plan](#), which encourages the broader application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in nuclear-weapon States in the most economic and practical manner possible.
- Opposed any attempts to exempt non-parties – specifically naming Israel as the only state in the region not party to the Treaty – from Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines, called for ending technical cooperation with non-party States, and advocated making comprehensive safeguards and legally binding non-acquisition commitments prerequisites for nuclear supply arrangements.
- Rejected attempts to link safeguards implementation with peaceful nuclear commerce and cooperation.

Concerning technological developments and their implications for the implementation of IAEA safeguards, the Arab Group, represented by Egypt:-

- Supported intergovernmental dialogue and international consensus on the potential role of Artificial Intelligence in verifying safeguards compliance, while emphasizing confidentiality, capacity-building and technology transfer.
- Rejected any review of safeguards based on technological developments unless explicitly anchored in Action 32 of the 2010 Action Plan, which calls for periodic reviews of IAEA safeguards in a manner consistent with Article III and aimed at avoiding constraints on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while stressing that technological developments should not result in new legal obligations or alter the existing legal basis of safeguards.

In its national capacity, Egypt: -

- Warned against the grave threat of nuclear materials and weapons reaching non-state actors and terrorist organizations, emphasizing the strict implementation of [UNSC Resolution 1540 \(2004\)](#), which requires States to adopt and enforce effective measures to prevent non-State actors from acquiring, developing, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and related materials.
- Rejected notions such as “friendly proliferation” and distinctions between “responsible” and “irresponsible” nuclear possessors, warning that such approaches undermine the integrity and credibility of the Treaty and could encourage other States to reconsider their commitments under the NPT.
- Devoted particular attention to naval nuclear propulsion arrangements, warning against any precedents that could undermine the safeguards system.
- Expressed concern regarding attacks or threats against nuclear facilities, stressing that such actions violate international law and the IAEA Statute, undermine the effectiveness of safeguards and the Agency’s ability to carry out its verification responsibilities, and pose serious risks to regional and international peace and security.