

Egypt articulates key positions during discussions on Rev.2 of the draft outcome document at the NPT RevCon XI

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On 18 May 2026, Egypt both in its national capacity and on behalf of the Arab Group, actively participated in the discussions on Rev.2 of the draft outcome document of the Eleventh Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)(see [here](#) and [here](#)).

Throughout the deliberations, Egypt emphasized the need to preserve the balance among the three pillars of the Treaty – namely nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy – and to safeguard previously agreed commitments and formulations, while supporting the adoption of a substantive and consensus-based outcome document.

With regard to the preambular section, Egypt, speaking on behalf of the Arab Group, welcomed the improvements introduced in several paragraphs, notably those concerning the characterization of the Treaty, the urgent implementation of [Article VI](#), and the promotion of universality. It strongly supported provisions reaffirming the validity of previous commitments, the need to uphold the norm against nuclear testing, and the balanced, full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Treaty. While taking note of proposals aimed at introducing additional non-proliferation language in preambular paragraph VII, Egypt argued that the balance of the preamble had already been secured through other provisions and cautioned against overloading the text in a manner that might disturb this equilibrium.

It expressed its disappointment over the merging of the provision concerning the urgent implementation of Article VI into another paragraph and called for its reinstatement as a standalone point. Furthermore, Egypt clarified that the initial provisions should not be limited solely to Articles I and II, but must encompass the implementation of all Treaty provisions to effectively contribute to international peace and security. It stressed that references to peaceful uses should remain faithful to [Article IV of the Treaty](#), which guarantees the inalienable right of all States Parties to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

Speaking in its national capacity, Egypt reinforced this position by expressing support for the President's formulation of preambular paragraph 3, which reaffirms that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, and argued that developments since 2010 provided even stronger

justification for maintaining – if not strengthening – previously agreed language. Egypt further noted that, since States Parties had already expressed deep concern regarding the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons in both the 2010 Action Plan and the 2020 draft outcome document, there was no logical basis for adopting weaker language in 2026.

Egypt also advocated restoring the formulation that the indefinite extension of the Treaty “does not imply”, in addition to “does not constitute an endorsement of”, the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, Egypt emphasized that replacing "reaffirming" with "recalling" in relation to the unequivocal undertaking to eliminate nuclear arsenals would weaken an already established commitment and therefore reiterated its call for restoring the stronger formulation. Additionally, Egypt highlighted that the norm against nuclear testing and the moratorium on nuclear explosions is complementary and do not represent a zero-sum choice, noting that the early entry into force of [the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty \(CTBT\)](#) had already been adequately addressed in paragraph 49 of Rev.2, which reaffirms the urgency of the Treaty's entry into force and calls upon all remaining Annex 2 States to ratify it without delay.

On issues relating to peaceful uses, Egypt defended the exact language of Article IV, paragraph 1, of the Treaty – which guarantees the inalienable right of all States Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II – and rejected attempts to introduce any wording that might create the impression that the exercise of the inalienable right to peaceful uses is conditional. Egypt emphasized that this right constitutes a matter of particular importance for developing countries and stressed that Review Conferences should build upon the Treaty without undermining either its letter or spirit.

Addressing Articles III and IV, the Arab Group represented by Egypt emphasized the complementarity between safeguards and peaceful uses and recalled that Article III, paragraph 3 – a provision intended to ensure that safeguards do not impede economic and technological development or international cooperation for peaceful purposes – provides that safeguards should be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities.

The Group further called for preserving the integrity of agreed language on safeguards-related concerns as reflected in Action 9 of the 2010 Action Plan, which establishes the IAEA's responsibility to consider submitted information, conduct investigations, draw conclusions and decide upon necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.

A major focus of the Arab Group's interventions concerned the relationship between [Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements \(CSAs\)](#) and [Additional Protocols](#). The Group stressed that CSAs – which are legally required under Article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty – constitute the foundation for the universal application of safeguards and opposed any attempt to blur the legal distinction between CSAs and Additional Protocols. The Group further insisted that Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements remain the safeguards standard and rejected attempts to elevate the status of the Additional Protocol at their expense. It therefore proposed deleting language suggesting that CSAs "also provide limited assurance" regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, arguing that such conclusions are closely associated with the Additional Protocol.

Furthermore, the Group emphasized the universal application of IAEA safeguards as a priority before referencing individual cases, and strongly rejected any inclusion of non-consensual IAEA documents, such as its glossary. The Group also joined other delegations in calling for the deletion of paragraph 13 in its current form, which encourages States to conclude and provisionally implement Additional Protocols and describes them as contributing to greater confidence in the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

The Group further reaffirmed that the decision to conclude an Additional Protocol remains voluntary and sovereign, although it becomes legally binding once in force. In this context, it proposed language derived from [Action 30 of the 2010 Action Plan](#), which calls for the universal application of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved. To this end, the Group formally proposed the insertion of a new paragraph 11 bis reproducing the language of Action 30 of the 2010 Action Plan. The Group stressed the importance of preserving the balance among the three pillars of the Treaty. The Arab Group also expressed its support for paragraph 18 of Rev.2 as drafted, which concerns naval nuclear propulsion and emphasizes the importance of transparent engagement with the IAEA consistent with safeguards obligations.

The Arab Group also supported the approach adopted in relation to discussions on nuclear-sharing arrangements. While acknowledging that paragraph 2 of Rev.2, dealing with nuclear-sharing and extended deterrence arrangements, did not fully reflect its substantive views, the Group considered continued dialogue among States Parties a useful means of promoting confidence and improving mutual understanding. At the same time, it questioned references to "ongoing discussions", arguing that genuine dialogue had yet to begin and that such exchanges require time and mutual engagement.