On 27 April 2026, the 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT RevCon XI) commenced at UN Headquarters in New York.

Both statements emphasized that the credibility and sustainability of the Treaty depend on the balanced implementation of the Treaty’s three pillars – nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT, nuclear non-proliferation under Articles I, II and III, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Article IV – and on the full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, adopted as part of the package that enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty and calling for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. 

Egypt stressed that the repeated failure of the 2015 and 2022 Review Conferences – the quinquennial meetings mandated to review the implementation of the Treaty and agree on future measures – to adopt consensual final documents highlighted the need to restore balance among the Treaty’s three pillars and reaffirmed that the commitments contained in the outcomes of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the 2000 Review Conference and the 2010 Review Conference – which established the principal political commitments of States Parties, including the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the Thirteen Practical Steps towards nuclear disarmament and the 64-point Action Plan – remain valid and should be implemented in a balanced and non-selective manner. Both Egypt and the Arab Group warned that a third consecutive failure of the Review Conference would carry serious implications for the credibility of the Treaty and international peace and security.

A central theme of both statements was the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty. Egypt emphasized that the continued existence of States outside the NPT constitutes a strategic gap affecting the credibility of the non-proliferation regime and called upon all non-parties to accede to the Treaty without exception. In this regard Egypt, speaking on behalf of the Arab Group, reiterated its call for Israel to join the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and to place all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, stressing that Israel’s continued non-accession undermines universality and prevents effective international verification. The Group also condemned Israeli nuclear threats and opposed the continuation of nuclear cooperation with non-party States pending their accession to the Treaty and the application of comprehensive safeguards.

Both Egypt and the Arab Group reaffirmed the central importance of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. They welcomed the progress achieved through the six sessions of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction established pursuant to UNGA Decision 73/546 (2018), and called upon all invited States and observers, particularly Israel and the United States, to participate constructively in the process with a view to negotiating a legally binding treaty.

On nuclear disarmament, Egypt and the Arab Group reaffirmed the legally binding nature of Article VI obligations, which require States Parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and recalled the Thirteen Practical Steps adopted in 2000 and the 64-point Action Plan agreed in 2010, which together constitute the principal politically agreed roadmap for the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments under the Treaty.

The Arab Group further emphasized that the possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States was never intended to constitute a permanent or acquired right but rather a temporary status pending the full implementation of Article VI. It also warned against attempts to reinterpret or condition Article VI obligations on the basis of strategic deterrence, strategic stability or prevailing security circumstances, and criticized the continued modernization of nuclear arsenals, nuclear-sharing arrangements and extended deterrence policies as inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Treaty.

Moreover, the Arab Group recalled the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, which affirmed the obligation to pursue and conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament and held that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the principles and rules of international humanitarian law.

Both statements emphasized that the complete, verifiable and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons remains the only guarantee against their use or threat of use. They therefore underlined that risk-reduction measures, including no-first-use policies, negative security assurances, voluntary moratoria on nuclear testing and the preservation of full human control over nuclear weapons systems, cannot substitute for legally binding disarmament obligations.

In this context, they called for legally binding, unconditional and non-discriminatory negative security assurances, measurable and time-bound benchmarks for implementation, and periodic reporting by nuclear-weapon States in order to enhance transparency and accountability. They further called for the implementation of nuclear disarmament through a clear, measurable and time-bound framework to ensure effective implementation of Article VI obligations. They stressed the importance of maintaining effective human control over nuclear weapons systems in light of developments in artificial intelligence and supported the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), adopted in 1996 to prohibit all nuclear explosions.

The Arab Group further stressed that the catastrophic humanitarian consequences associated with any use of nuclear weapons reinforce the moral and legal imperative of achieving their total elimination.

On the peaceful uses pillar, Egypt and the Arab Group reaffirmed the inalienable right recognized under Article IV of the Treaty, which guarantees the right of States Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. They stressed that peaceful nuclear cooperation constitutes a legal entitlement rather than a privilege and opposed the imposition of additional restrictions on non-nuclear-weapon States.

Regarding safeguards, both Egypt and the Arab Group emphasized that the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreementsunder Article III of the Treaty constitute the applicable verification standard and rejected attempts to politicize safeguards implementation or establish parallel oversight frameworks outside the NPT. They further reaffirmed that the IAEA remains the sole competent international authority for nuclear verification and that its verification activities should be conducted professionally, impartially and in accordance with the Agency's Statute. The Arab Group reiterated that the Additional Protocol – an optional safeguards agreement granting the IAEA expanded access and verification authorities beyond those required under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements – remains voluntary and subject to the sovereign decision of each State. 

The Arab Group further emphasized that all Arab States have fulfilled their obligations under the Treaty by concluding such agreements with the IAEA. Both statements also expressed concern regarding the application of different safeguards standards and discriminatory nuclear cooperation with States outside the Treaty.

Egypt and the Arab Group also emphasized that attacks and threats against safeguarded peaceful nuclear facilities are unacceptable because of their grave humanitarian, environmental and international security consequences. They further stressed that dialogue and cooperation with the IAEA remain the appropriate means for addressing concerns related to the Iranian nuclear programme.

The Arab Group also called for reviewing the Review Conference process and its rules of procedure with a view to strengthening the effectiveness of future review cycles and preserving the integrity and credibility of the Treaty review mechanism.

**For a comprehensive overview of Egypt's positions throughout the Eleventh NPT Review Conference, see the related posts covering its interventions during Main Committee I, Main Committee II, Main Committee III, the Plenary discussions, and the Closing Session.